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Abstract — This paper presents several novel covert channels 
in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) - a specialized 
Web transfer protocol used for Internet of Things. The 
suggested new covert channels are categorized according to the 
pattern-based classification, and, for each covert channel, the 
total number of hidden data bits transmitted per second, or   
per protocol data unit is given, together with the theoretical 
performance evaluation. Additionally, we present a 
methodology for power consumption analysis of these covert 
channels, and we give the experimental results of applying this 
methodology for one of the discovered CoAP covert channels. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We have investigated several novel covert channels for 
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) in the 
conference paper [1]. In this paper, we extend the results 
with an experimental methodology for power consumption 
analysis of these covert channels, and we give the 
experimental results of  applying this methodology for one of 
the discovered CoAP covert channels. 
Network steganography is a practice of hiding data in 
legitimate transmissions in communication networks, by 
deploying different network protocols as carriers, and 
concealing the presence of hidden data from network 
devices. It provides only security through obscurity.  
Covert channels are first introduced by Lampson [10] as 
channels “not intended for information transfer at all” and 
they can be exploited by a process to transfer information in 
a manner that violates the systems security policy. The 
current distinction between the network steganography and 
covert channels is artificial, especially in a communication 
networks environment. Network steganography techniques 
create covert channels for hidden communication, but such 
covert channels do not exist in communication networks 
without steganography [14]. There is no some algorithm for 
exaustive search of all covert channels in a given protocol. 
Covert channels can be divided in two basic groups: 
storage and timing channels. Storage covert channels are 
channels where one process writes (directly or indirectly) to 
a shared resource, while another process reads from it. In the 
context of network steganography, storage covert channels 
hide data by storing them in the protocol header and/or in the 
Protocol Data Unit (PDU). On the other hand, timing 
channels hide data by deploying some form of timing of 
events, such as retransmitting the same PDU several times, 
or changing the packet order. 
Network-based covert channels may have black hat or 
white hat applications. Black hat applications include 
coordination of distributed denial of service attacks, 
spreading of malware (for example, by hiding command and 
control traffic of botnets), industrial espionage,  secret 
communication between terrorists and criminals, etc. On the 
other hand, white hat applications include covert military 
communication in hostile environments, prevention of 
detection of illicit information transferred by journalists or 
whistle-blowers, circumvention of the limitation in using 
Internet in some countries (e.g., Infranet [4]), providing 
Quality of Service - QoS for Voice over Internet Protocol - 
VoIP traffic [12], secure network management 
communication [6], watermarking of network flows (e.g., 
RAINBOW [8]), tracing encrypted attack traffic or tracking 
anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls [21][22], etc. 
Nowadays, there are a plenty of choices in the landscape 
of network protocols for carriers. There are several surveys 
about different covert channels in many TCP/IP 
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) protocols 
[15][26]. To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few 
papers about network steganographic research addressing 
protocols specialized for constrained devices in the IoT 
(sensors, vehicles, home appliances, wearable devices, and 
so on) [3] [9]. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) 
[19] is a specialized Web transfer application layer protocol,  
which can be used with constrained nodes and constrained 
networks in the IoT. The nodes are constrained because they 
have 8-bit microcontrollers, for example, with limited 
random-access memory (RAM) and read-only memory 
(ROM). Constrained networks often have high packet error 
rates and small data rate (such as IPv6 over Low-Power 
Wireless Personal Area Networks - 6LoWPANs). CoAP is 
designed for machine-to-machine (M2M) applications and 
its last stable version was published in June 2014 in the RFC 
7252 [19]. In fact, it is a Representational State Transfer -
RESTful protocol with multicast and observe support. In this 
paper, we try to apply existing network steganographic 
techniques for creating covert channels in CoAP. 
Wendzel et al. [24] presented a new pattern-based 
categorization of network covert channel techniques into 11 
different patterns or classes. They represented the patterns in 
a hierarchical catalog using the pattern language Pattern 
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Figure 1.  Pattern-based categorization of network covert channel techniques 
Language Markup Language (PLML) v. 1.1 [5]. A 
modification of this categorization is made by Mazurczyk et 
al. [14]. In our paper, we use this joint classification (see 
Figure 1) to characterize our covert channels. 
Covert channels are analyzed through the total number of 
hidden data bits transmitted per second (Raw Bit Rate - 
RBR), or through the total number of hidden data bits 
transmitted per PDU (for example, Packet Raw Bit Rate- 
PRBR) [13]. For each new CoAP channel, its PRBR value is 
given, where PDU is a CoAP message. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The 
related work is presented in Section II. Details about the 
CoAP header, messages, functionalities and concepts are 
presented in Section III. The main Section IV describes eight 
groups of new covert storage and timing channels in CoAP, 
that can be used regardless its transport carrier (DTLS or 
clear UDP). Some possible applications of these covert 
channels are also briefly suggested in this section. In Section 
V we present the performance evaluation, while the 
experimental evaluation of one of the new covert channels is 
given in Section VI. We conclude the paper in Section VII. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The research on network steganography for IoT has seen 
an increased interest recently.  
One example for this is the work of Islam et al. [9], 
which uses Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) covert 
channels for authenticating Internet packet routers as an 
intermediate step towards proximal geolocation of IoT 
devices. This is useful as a defense from the knowledgeable 
adversary that might attempt to evade or forge the 
geolocation. Hidden data are stored in the data field of the 
ICMP Echo Request and ICMP Echo Reply messages.  
Patuck et al. [18] present several storage covert channels 
in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), 
a popular instant messaging protocol based on XML, which 
in the past was used by many messaging platforms such as 
Google Talk, AOL Instant Messenger, Microsoft Messenger 
Sevice, etc. These covert channels use some attributes in the 
XMPP messages, like Type, id and xml:lang attributes, or 
the message body. For example, for the Type attribute, three 
covert channels are presented: by changing cases of the 
value, by changing value, or by presence/absence of the 
attribute.  
A storage covert channel with modulated sensor readings 
is presented by Tuptuh et al. [20] for wireless sensor 
networks. In this channel, LSBs of encrypted sensor readings 
are the cover bits. The sender performs the following 
algorithm: while LSB bit of the current reading is different 
from the cover bit, small offset is added to the sensor reading 
(e.g., temperature) and the value is encrypted. 
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Building Automation and Control Networking Protocol 
(BACnet) is another protocol for which two storage 
(message-type based and parameter-based) and one timing 
(with inter packet gaps) covert channels were given by 
Wendzel [23]. 
Wendzel et al. [25] have showed that even a cyber-
physical system (CPS) can be used for network 
steganography. One can places hidden data in the CPS 
environment by slightly modifying some of its components, 
like actuators, sensors, controllers, and monitoring 
equipment. The authors apply the term scatter hoarding, 
which means that only small modifications of the CPS will 
be allowed but they will be applied to numerous carefully 
selected components, to avoid them being regularly 
modified, e.g., by a human user. One example is the 
temperature sensor, which comprises two 8-bit alarm 
registers with a lower and an upper warning threshold, and 
can be used to store hidden values. Another example is the 
state modulation of actuators, like heater, in which the 
heating value of 80% will be a binary “0”, and of 79% will 
be a binary “1”. Because the actuator states change and 
influence the physical environment, steganographic 
operations may not be robust and be easily detectable and 
thus need a reasonable storage strategy. 
 Some applications of steganography in IoT are not 
connected with the protocols themselves, but with the 
applications on top of these protocols. For example, Denney 
et al. [3] present a novel storage covert channel on wearable 
devices that sends data to other applications, or even to other 
nearby devices, through the use of notifications that are 
normally displayed on the status bar of an Android device. 
For that purpose, a notification listening service on the 
wearables needs to be implemented. Data are hidden in the 
notification ID numbers (32 bits), and their exchange is done 
by using two functions notify and cancel. If the notifying 
function is immediately followed by the canceling function, 
the notification is never displayed to the user although it can 
be seen in the log files, so the communication is hidden from 
the user who wears the device. 
There are several papers that deploy steganography in the 
physical or medium access control (MAC) layers [7][11][16] 
[19]. 
As far as we now, there is no paper (other than [1]) that 
analyze existance of covert channels in CoAP. Additionally, 
we try to give a methodology how one can perform a power 
consumption analysis of a given covert channel in the IoT 
device. 
 
III. HOW COAP WORKS 
Similar to HTTP, CoAP uses client/server model with 
request/response messages. It supports built-in discovery of 
services and resources, Uniform resource identifiers (URIs) 
and Internet media types. The CoAP sends request message 
requesting an action (using a Method Code) to the resource 
(idenified by a URI) hosted on  server. The server responds 
to this request by using the response message that contains 
the Response Code, and possibly some resource 
representation. CoAP defines four types of messages: 
Confirmable  (CON), Non-Confirmable (NON), 
Acknowledgment (ACK) and Reset (RST). These types of 
messages use method and response codes to transmit 
requests or answers. The requests can be transmitted as 
Confirmable and Non-Confirmable types of messages, while 
the responses can be transmitted through these and via 
piggybacked and Acknowledgment types of messages.  
CoAP uses clear UDP or DTLS on transport layer to 
exchange messages asynchronously between endpoints.  As 
shown in Figure 2, each message contains a Message ID 
used for optimal reliability and to detect duplicates. A 
message that requires reliable transmission is marked as 
CON, and if does not, it is marked as NON.  The CON 
message is retransmitted using a default timeout and binary 
exponential back-off algorithm for increasing the timeout 
between retransmissions, until the recipient sends an ACK 
message with the  same  Message ID.  When  the recipient  is   
not able at all to process CON or NON message, it replies 
with a RST message. 
 
 
Figure 2.  a) Reliable CoAP message transmission b) Unreliable CoAP 
message transmission. 
 
CoAP messages are encoded into simple binary format 
(see Figure 3). Each message starts with a 4B fixed header, 
followed by a Token field, with size from 0 to 8B. Then 
comes the optional Options field and optional Payload field. 
If the Payload field is present it is preceded by one-byte 
Payload Marker (0xFF).  
The fields that make up the message header are the 
following: 
 
• Version (Ver) -  2-bit unsigned integer that idenitfies the 
CoAP version. Currently it must be set to 01. 
• Type (T) – 2-bit unsigned integer that indicates the 
message type: Confirmable (0), Non-Confirmable(1), 
Acknowledgement (2), or Reset (3).  
• Token Length (TKL) – 4-bit unsigned integer that stands 
for the length of the Token field (0-64 bits). Lengths 9-
15 are reserved and must be processed as a message 
format error. 
• Code – 8-bit unsigned integer. It is divided into two 
parts: 3-bit class (the most significant bits) and 5-bit 
details (the least significant bits). The format of the code 
is “c.dd”, where “c” is a digit from 0 to 7 and represents 
the class while “dd” are two digits from 00 to 31. 
According to the class we can determine the type of the 
message, such as: request (0), a successful response (2), 
a client error response (4), or a server error response (5). 
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CoAP has a separate code registry that provides a 
description for all codes [2]. 
• Message ID -  16-bit unsigned integer that is used to 
detect duplicate messages and to connect 
Acknowledgment/Reset messages with Confirmable/ 
Non-Confirmable messages. 
The message header is followed by the Token field with 
variable size from 0 to 64 bits. This field is used to link 
requests and responses. 
The optional Options field defines one or more options. 
CoAP defines a single set of options that are used both for 
requests and for responses. These are: Content-Format, Etag, 
Location-Path, Location-Query, Max-Age, Proxy-Uri, 
Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port, Uri-Query, 
Accept, If-Match, If-None-Match, and Size1.  
The payload of requests/responses that indicates success 
typically carries the resource representation or the result of 
the requested action. 
 
 
Figure 3.  CoAP message format. 
 
 
Figure 4.  a) Piggybacked response b) Separate response. 
 
There are two types of responses: piggybacked and 
separate (Figure 4). If the request is transmitted via CON or 
NON message, and if the response is available and 
transmitted via an ACK message, then it is piggybacked 
response. If the server is unable to respond immediately to 
the request, an Empty message (with code 0.00) is sent that 
tells the client to stop sending the request. If the server is 
able for later respond to the client, it sends a CON message 
that must then be confirmed by the client. This is called a 
separate response.  
Similar to  HTTP, CoAP uses GET (with code 0.01), 
POST  (with code 0.02), PUT  (with code 0.03), and 
DELETE  (with code 0.04) methods. 
 
IV. NEW COVERT CHANNELS IN THE COAP 
When someone creates a covert channel (CC) in network 
protocol, usually uses: a protocol feature that has a dual 
nature (i.e., the same feature can be obtained in more than 
one way), a feature that is not mandatory, a feature that can 
obtain random value, and so on. Therefore if we use some of 
these features, we can create new covert channels in CoAP. 
From the beginning, CoAP offers some protection against 
network steganography. For example, by introducing a 
proper order in the appearance of different options in 
message, the steganographic techniques that deploy different 
order of options can not be applied. 
CoAP can be applied in different fields, such as: smart 
energy, smart grid, building control, intelligent lighting 
control, industrial control systems, asset tracking, 
environment monitoring, and so on. So, one useful scenario 
of application of the CoAP covert channels would be for 
support of the authentication of geolocation of IoT devices. 
Another possible scenario is clandestine communication 
between wearable devices in a hostile environment, for the 
needs of the soldiers, or, between nodes in a wireless sensor 
network. 
As steganography offers only security through obscurity, 
a successful attack against any covert channel consists in 
detecting the existence of this communication. Next, the new 
CoAP covert channels are presented. 
A. Covert Channel Using Token and/or Message ID Fields 
The Message ID contains a random 16-bit value.  In the 
case of piggybacked response for CON message, the 
Message ID should be the same as in the request, while in 
the case of separate response, the server generate different 
random Message ID (while the request Message ID is copied 
in the first sent Empty ACK message). 
The same Message ID can not be reused (in the 
communication between same two endpoints) within the 
EXCHANGE\_LIFETIME, which is around 247 seconds 
with the default transmission parameters. 
The Token is another random generated field, with 
variable size up to 64 bits, used as a client-local identifier to 
make a difference between concurrent requests. If the request 
results in the response, the Token value should be echoed in 
that response. This also happens in the case when the server 
sends separate response. So, we can create an unidirectional 
or a bidirectional communication channel between two hosts, 
by sending 16 (from Message ID) plus/or 64 (from Token 
ID) bits per message (PRBR  {16, 64, 80}). According to 
the pattern-based classification [14][24], this channel 
belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Non-Payload 
  --Structure Preserving 
    --Modification of an Attribute 
     --Random Value Pattern 
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B. Covert Channel Using Piggybacked and Separate 
Response 
Since the server has a choice for sending piggybacked or 
separate response, one can create an one-bit per message 
unidirectional or a bidirectional covert channel (PRBR=1), 
such as: 
• piggybacked response to be binary 1, and 
• separate response to be binary 0. 
 
At heavy load, the server may not be able to respond 
(sending binary 1), so this covert channel is limited to the 
times when the server has the choice. According to the 
pattern-based classification [14][24], this channel belongs to 
the following class: 
 
Network Covert Timing Channels 
 --Protocol aware 
  --Message ordering pattern 
C. Covert Channel Using Payload of the Message 
Both requests and responses may include a payload, 
depending of the Method or the Response Code, 
respectively. Its format is specified by the Internet media 
type and content coding providen by the Content-Format 
option. The payload of requests or of responses that indicates 
success is typically a representation of the resource or the 
result of the requested action. 
If no Content-Format option is given, the payload of 
responses indicating client or server error is a Diagnostic 
Payload, with brief human-readable diagnostic message 
being encoded using UTF-8 (Unicode Transformation 
Format) in Net-Unicode form. 
The CoAP specification provides only an upper bound to 
the message size - to fit within a single IP datagram (and into 
one UDP payload). The maximal size of the IPv4 datagram 
is 65,535B, but this can not be applied to constrained devices 
and networks. According to IPv4 specification in the RFC 
791, all hosts have to be prepared to accept datagrams of up 
to 576B, while IPv6 requires the maximum transmission unit 
(MTU) to be at least 1280B. The absolute minimum value of 
the IP MTU for IPv4 is 68B, which would leave at most 35B 
for a CoAP payload (the smallest CoAP header size with 
Payload Marker before the payload is 5B, assuming 0B for 
Token and no options). On the other hand, constrained 
network presents another restriction. For example, the IEEE 
802.15.4's standard packet size is 127B (with 25B of 
maximum frame overhead), which leaves (without any 
security features) 102B for upper layers. The sizes of the 
input/output buffers in the constrained devices are another 
restriction of the maximal payload. Thus, we can create a 
unidirectional or a bidirectional communication channel 
between two hosts, by sending a Diagnostic Payload with the 
smallest maximal size of 35B per message (PRBR=280). 
According to the pattern-based classification [14][24], this 
channel belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Payload Pattern 
 
Another similar channel can be created by encoding the 
data in some specific Internet media format (for example, 
“application/xml” media type) and sending this format as 
payload of a message with appropriate Content-Format 
option (41 for “application/xml”). 
D. Covert Channel Using Case-insensitive Parts of the 
URIs 
CoAP uses “coap” and “coaps” URI (Uniform Resource 
Identifier) schemes for identification of CoAP resources and 
providing a means for locating the resource. The URIs in the 
request are transported in several options: URI-host, URI-
Path, URI-Port and URI-Query. They are used to specify the 
target resource of a request to CoAP origin server. The URI-
host and the scheme are case insensitive, while all other 
components are case-sensitive. So, we can create a 
unidirectional covert channel between the client and the 
server using, for example: 
• capital letter in the URI-host option to be binary 1, 
and 
• small letter in the URI-host option to be binary 0. 
 
Taking into account that valid Domain Name System 
(DNS) name has at most 255B, we can send at most 255B 
per message, or in other words, the PRBR of this channel is 
up to 255B. According to the pattern-based classification 
[14][24], this channel belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Non-Payload 
  --Structure Preserving 
   --Modification of an Attribute 
    --Value Modulation 
     --Case Pattern 
 
CoAP supports proxying, where proxy is a CoAP 
endpoint that can be tasked by CoAP clients to perform 
requests on their behalf. Proxies can be explicitly selected by 
clients, using the Proxi-URI option, and this role is “forward-
proxy”. Proxies can also be inserted to stand in for origin 
servers, a role that is named as "reverse-proxy". So, we can 
create similar covert channel using schema and host part 
from the Proxi-URI option. A request containing the Proxy-
URI Option must not include URI-host, URI-Path, URI-Port 
and URI-Query options. 
E. Covert Channel Using PUT and DELETE Methods 
The PUT method requires the resource identified by the 
URI in the request, to be updated or created with the 
enclosed representation. If the resource exists at the request 
URI, the enclosed representation should be considered as a 
modified version of that resource, and a 2.04 (Changed) 
Response Code should be returned. If no resource exists, 
then the server may create a new resource with the same URI 
that results in a 2.01 (Created) Response Code.  
The DELETE method requires deletion of the resource, 
which is identified by the URI in the request.  Regardless if 
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the deletion is successful, or the resource did not exist before 
the request, a 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code should be send. 
If somebody has a known representation of the existing 
resource R1 on the server and if he knows that specific 
resource R2 does not exist on the same server, a 
unidirectional covert channel to the server can be created, in 
this way: 
• send request with PUT method to create the resource 
R1 with enclosed known representation as binary 1, 
and 
• send request with DELETE method to delete non-
existing resource R2 as binary 0. 
 
In this way, one bit per message can be sent (PRBP=1). 
According to the pattern-based classification [14][24], this 
channel belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Non-Payload 
  --Structure Preserving 
   --Modification of an Attribute 
    --Value Modulation Pattern 
F. Covert Channel Using Accept Option 
The Accept option can be used to indicate which 
Content-Format is acceptable to the client.  If no Accept 
option is given, the client does not express a preference.  If 
the preferred Content-Format if available, the server returns 
in that format, otherwise, a 4.06 "Not Acceptable" must be 
sent as a response, unless another error code takes 
precedence for this response. We can create a unidirectional 
one-bit per message covert channel (PRBP=1), in this way: 
• sending a given message without Accept option to 
be binary 1, and 
• sending a given message with Accept option to be 
binary 0. 
 
According to the pattern-based classification [14][24], 
this channel belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Non-Payload 
  --Structure Modifying 
   --Add Redundancy Pattern  
G. Covert Channel Using Conditional Requests 
Conditional request options If-Match and If-None-Match 
enable a client to ask the server to perform the request only if 
certain conditions specified by the option are fulfilled. In the 
case of multiple If-Match options the client can make a 
conditional request on the current existence or value of an 
ETag for one or more representations of the target resource. 
This is useful to update the request of the resource, as a 
means for protecting against accidental overwrites when 
multiple clients are acting in parallel on the same resource. 
The condition is not fulfilled if none of the options match. 
With If-None-Match option the client can make a conditional 
request on the current nonexistence of a given resource. If 
the target resource does exist, then the condition is not 
fulfilled. 
If somebody knows for sure that given condition C1 is 
fulfilled (for example, the resource is created or deleted in 
previous message) and other C2 is not fulfilled, using either 
of If-Match and If-None-Match options, a unidirectional 
one-bit per message covert channel (PRBP=1) can be created 
in this way: 
• sending a given message without fulfilled condition 
to be binary 1 (e.g., If-Match + C2), and 
• sending a given message with fulfilled condition 
(e.g., If-Match + C1) to be binary 0. 
 
According to the pattern-based classification [14][24], 
this channel belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Storage Channels 
 --Modification of Non-Payload 
  --Structure Preserving 
   --Modification of an Attribute 
    --Value Modulation Pattern 
H. Covert Channel Using Re-Transmissions 
If we are using CoAP in channels with small error-rate 
(to cope with the unreliable nature of UDP), we can create a 
unidirectional or a bidirectional covert channel using 
retransmissions with PRBP=1, in this way: 
• sending a given message only once to be binary 1, 
and 
• sending a given message two or more times to be 
binary 0. 
 
In this way, one bit per message can be sent. According 
to the pattern-based classification [14][24], this channel 
belongs to the following class: 
 
Network Covert Timing Channels 
--Protocol aware 
  --Re-Transmission pattern 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Suppose that two IoT devices communicate with CoAP 
every t seconds. 
Any covert channel with a given PRBR will need at least 
 
ceil(l / PRBR)  t (s) 
 
for sending a message with length l bits.   
We can evaluate the minimum time for sending the 
message ”Hello, world!” using the newly suggested covert 
channels. The message has length of 13 7-bit ASCII 
characters or l=91 bits. Results are given in Table I. 
So, we can see that not all suggested covert channels in 
CoAP are able to send short messages in real time, especially 
the ones with PRBR=1. Still, the covert channels 3 and 4 can 
be used for sending a short message per one CoAP message, 
without rising any suspicions. If the time for sending the 
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message is not so important, one can choose covert channels 
1 or 2, without rising any suspicions. 
TABLE I.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW COVERT 
CHANNELS FOR SENDING THE MESSAGE “HELLO, WORLD!” 
No. Type of CC PRBR 
Time (s) 
t=1s t=5s t=10s 
1 
CC using 
token and/or 
message ID 
Fields 
16 6 30 60 
64 2 10 20 
80 2 10 20 
2 
CC using 
piggybacked 
and separate 
response 
1 91 455 910 
3 
CC using 
payload of the 
message 
280 1 1 1 
4 
CC using case-
insensitive 
parts of the 
URIs 
2040 1 1 1 
5 
CC using PUT 
and DELETE 
Methods 
1 91 455 910 
6 
CC using 
Accept option 
1 91 455 910 
7 
CC using 
conditional 
requests 
1 91 455 910 
8 
CC using re-
transmissions 
1 91 455 910 
 
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW COVERT 
CHANNELS WITH PRBR>1 FOR SENDING 320X240 RAW COLOR IMAGE 
(WITH 24-BIT PIXELS) 
 
Type of 
CC 
PRBR 
Time(s) 
t=1s t=5s 
1 
CC using 
token 
and/or 
message 
ID Fields 
16 
115200 
(32h) 
576000 
(160h) 
64 
28800 
(8h) 
144000 
(40h) 
80 
23040 
(6,4h) 
115200 
(32h) 
2 
CC using 
payload of 
the 
message 
280 
6583 
(>1,82h) 
32915 
(>9.1h) 
3 
CC using 
case-
insensitive 
parts of the 
URIs 
2040 
904 
(15 min) 
4520 
(76 min) 
 
 
Additionally, we can evaluate the minimum time for 
sending the 320x240 raw color image (with 24-bit pixels) 
using the newly suggested covert channels. The size of the 
image is 225KB or l=1843200 bits. Results are given in 
Table II.  
The results from Table II show that most of the new 
CoAP covert channels are not quite suitable for sending 
images, because of the large transmission time. The covert 
channel 3 is the most suitable for that purpose (it will send 
225KB image in 15 minutes). 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
For our research we have used Contiki OS, and specially, 
Instant Contiki version 3.0 as a development environment. It 
is a Ubuntu Linux virtual machine that runs in VMWare 
player. It has all the development tools, compilers and 
simulators. We can develop our application and test it on one 
of the devices in simulator. We used Cooja simulator. With 
it, we can create different types of devices for which we can 
develop applications. This is practical because before we 
execute our application on real device we will make sure it 
works properly.  
For the purposes of our research we used Z1 Zolertia 
Mote. It is an ultra low power wireless module for use in 
wireless sensor networks (WSN). Z1 has the second 
generation of MSP430F2617 low power microcontroller, 
which has a powerful 16-bit RISC CPU @16MHz clock 
speed. It also has built-in clock factory calibration, 8KB 
RAM and a 92KB Flash memory. Z1 module includes the 
CC2420 transceiver, which operates at 2.4GHz with data rate 
of  250Kbps and it supports 802.15.4 standard to interoperate 
with other devices. This module has a built-in temperature 
and 3-axis accelerometer sensors. Z1 allows flexible 
powering using the battery pack (2xAA or 2xAAA), Coin 
Cell, USB and with direct connection. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Implementation scenario 
 
In our research, we used Copper (Cu) as a CoAP user-
agent. It is a Firefox plugin that installs a handler for “coap” 
URI scheme and allows users to browse and interact with 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The scenario for our 
research is presented on Figure 5. We used the Cooja 
simulator to create a new simulation with, 2 Z1 Zolertia 
motes. One Z1 mote is for Border Router. As a source we 
used rpl-border router source code that is located in: 
 
/home/user/contiki-3.0/examples/ipv6/rpl-border-router 
 
The other Z1 mote is for CoAP server. In our research we 
used Erbium implementation of CoAP server for Contiki OS. 
The source code is located in: 
 
/home/user/contiki-3.0/examples/er-rest-example 
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To adjust it to our needs, we made a change to the source 
code, specifically in the file “res-hello.c” that is located in 
the following path in Contiki: 
 
/home/user/contiki-3.0/examples/er-rest-
example/resources 
 
According to this scenario, we have implemented the 
covert channel that uses the PUT and DELETE methods. By 
using Copper user-agent, we created request using the PUT 
and DELETE methods (with PUT in the 50th second of the 
execution of the simulation and with DELETE in the 60th 
second of the execution of the simulation). We also 
examined power consumption in case when we do not 
implement a covert channel and in the case of an 
implemented covert channel. To calculate the power 
consumption, we used the data obtained with the tool 
“Powertrace” for CoAP server with and without 
implemented covert channel. These data are printed at the 
mote output for Z1 module in Cooja. We made the 
calculations in a total time interval of 100 seconds as 
previously predefined interval for performing the simulation 
for both cases. These data show the total number of clock 
ticks in different states of the module: CPU (CPU in active 
mode), LPM (CPU in Low Power Mode), TX (Transmit) and 
RX (Receive) (Table III and Table IV).  
 
TABLE III.  DATA OBTAINED WITH “POWERTRACE” FOR “COAP” 
SERVER WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF COVERT CHANNEL 
ALL_CPU ALL_LPM ALL_TX ALL_RX 
4674 322863 149 294987 
9879 645197 229 622586 
15204 967576 412 950244 
17500 1292676 412 1277763 
19778 1617956 412 1605442 
24933 1940346 514 1933022 
27435 2265399 594 2260619 
29721 2590672 594 2588298 
32001 2915952 594 2915978 
34271 3241241 594 3243658 
39491 3563562 675 3571258 
 
To calculate the power consumption, we used the 
following formula [27] : 
 
RuntimeSECONDRTIMER
VoltageCurrentvalueEnergest
nconsumptioPower
*_
**_
_ =  
 
Energest_value is the difference between the number of 
clock ticks (in states CPU, LPM, TX and RX) between two 
time intervals. We used the Z1 datasheet to get the values for 
Current in different states (Approximate Current 
Consumption of Z1 circuits: Active Mode @16MHz - < 10 
mA (approximate 9mA), Standby Mode - 0.5µA, RX Mode - 
18.8mA, TX Mode - 17.4mA) [28]. The value for Voltage 
parameter is 3V. The value for RTIMER_SECOND is 32768. 
Runtime is the time interval (10 seconds in our case). 
 
TABLE IV.  DATA OBTAINED  WITH “POWERTRACE” FOR “COAP” 
SERVER WITH IMPLEMENTED COVERT CHANNEL 
ALL_CPU ALL_LPM ALL_TX ALL_RX 
4726 322829 149 294987 
10020 645086 229 622586 
15271 967393 332 950165 
17738 1292480 413 1277762 
20253 1617524 476 1605379 
25731 1939607 641 1932896 
28236 2264657 722 2260493 
30521 2589930 722 2588173 
32801 2915210 722 2915853 
35071 3240499 722 3243533 
40372 3562751 802 3571132 
 
 
Figure 6.  Power consumption for CoAP server (Z1) in CPU state (with 
and without implemented covert channel) 
 
Figure 6 shows the power consumption for Z1 module 
(implemented as CoAP server) in CPU state with and 
without implemented covert channel. The average power 
consumption without implemented covert channel is 
0.28688324 mW, while the average power consumption 
with implemented covert channel is 0.293713989 mW. We 
can see that the average power consumption with an 
implemented covert channel is bigger. 
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Figure 7 shows the power consumption for Z1 module 
(implemented as CoAP server) in LPM state with and 
without implemented covert channel. The average power 
consumption without implemented covert channel is 
0.001483474 mW, while the average power consumption 
with implemented covert channel is 0.001483119 mW. We 
can see that the average power consumption with 
implemented covert channel is slightly smaller than the 
power consumption without implemented covert channel. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Power consumption for CoAP server (Z1) in LPM state (with 
and without implemented covert channel) 
 
 
Figure 8.  Power consumption for CoAP server (Z1) in TX state (with and 
without implemented covert channel) 
 
Figure 8 shows the power consumption for Z1 module 
(implemented as CoAP server) in TX state with and without 
implemented covert channel. The average power 
consumption without implemented covert channel is 
0.008379272 mW, while the average power consumption 
with implemented covert channel is 0.010402405 mW. We 
can see that the power consumption with implemented 
covert channel is around 1.24 times greater than the power 
consumption without implemented covert channel. 
Figure 9 shows the power consumption for Z1 module 
(implemented as CoAP server) in RX state with and without 
implemented covert channel. The average power 
consumption without implemented covert channel is 
56.3908949 mW, while the average power consumption 
with implemented covert channel is 56.3887262 mW.  
We can see that the average power consumption with 
implemented covert channel is slightly smaller than the 
power consumption without implemented covert channel. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Power consumption for CoAP server (Z1) in RX state (with and 
without implemented covert channel) 
 
 
Figure 10.  Total power consumption for CoAP server (Z1) in all states 
(with and without implemented covert channel) 
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Figure 10 shows the total power consumption for Z1 
module (implemented as CoAP server) in all states, in each 
time interval with and without implemented covert channel. 
The average power consumption without implemented 
covert channel is 56.68764088mW, while the average power 
consumption with implemented covert channel is 
56.69432571mW. We can see that the average power 
consumption (in all states) for Z1 module with implemented 
covert channel (when sending two bits) is slightly greater 
than the power consumption without implemented covert 
channel. 
The power consumption of the Z1 module in the 50th 
second (the time when we sent a request with the PUT 
method) with implemented covert channel has increased 
very little, for only 0.02580548 mW.  
We have the same case in the 60th second (the time when 
we sent a request with the DELETE method), when the 
power consumption with implemented covert channel has 
increased very little, for only 0.00040648 mW. The 
implementation of the covert channel using the PUT and 
DELETE methods does not greatly affect the power 
consumption of the Z1 module. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Considering that IoT will consist of about 30 billion 
objects by 2020 [17], CoAP belongs to the group of possible 
most exploited protocols in the forthcoming years. The 
CoAP covert channels presented here, are suitable for 
sending short messages, as our performance evaluation 
showed. Additionally, the performed experimental 
evaluation of power consumption analysis on one of the 
covert channels, shows only a slight increase in the power 
consumption of the used device, when sending two bits. The 
consequence of all these results, is the importance of 
identifying as much as it can, the possible ways of hiding 
data in CoAP and trying to mitigate them. One can deploy 
active and passive wardens for this purpose, but this is left 
for later investigation.  
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